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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD RALPH OLSEN by his 
Guardian Ad Litem, Ralph E. Olsen, 
Plaintiff and Appella.nt, 
-vs.-
SHELDON T. W ARWOOD, BOARD 
OF EDUCATION OF THE AL-
PINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a 
Body Corporate; CLIF'TON R. 
CLARK, CLARENCE D. ASH-
TON, VICTOR C. ANDERSON, 
THOMAS P 0 WE·R S-, and 
THOMAS A. BARRATT, Members 
of the Board of Education of the 
Alpine School District, a Body Cor-
porate, · 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 7789 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The different versions of the evidence in this case 
may best be outlined in that part of the brief dealing with 
the arguments to which they apply. Therefore, the de-
fendants and respondents will not at this time review the 
evidence except to state that the jurys' finding in favor of 
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the defendants in this case requires that conflicts in the 
evidence be resolved in defendants' favor and the evi-
dence be considered in the light most favorable to the 
defendants. 
The appellant seeks a reversal of this case upon four 
grounds, all of which go to the giving or refusal of the 
court to give certain instruction. It is the purpose of · 
this brief to demonstrate the correctness of the court's 
action, the converse of appellant's position, and in doing 
so we will accept the breakdown of the appellant's brief 
and deal with the argument as follows: 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY· REFUSED PLAIN-
TIFF'S .REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER ONE AND 
CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON DEFEND-
ANT'S DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NUMBER 7 (TRANSCRIPT 223) TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF JURORS 
MUST AGREE UPON THE SAME NEGLIGENT ·ACT OR 
ACTS OR OMISSIONS IN ORDER TO RETURN A VERDICT 
IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR. 
POINT THREE 
THE EVIDENCE WARRANTED THE COURT'S GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 9 (TRANSCRIPT 224) TO THE 
EFFECT THAT IF THE JURY SHOULD FIND THAT PLAIN-
TIFF RAN TOWARD THE BUS AT A TIME AND IN A 
PLACE WHERE DEFENDANT COULD NOT SEE HIM 
THEY SHOU'LD RETURN A VERDICT· IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANT IF THEY FURTHER FOUND PLAINTIFF 
DID NOT EXPECT SUCH ACTION AND ACTED AS A 
REASONABL~ AND PRUDENT PERSON UNDER THE EX-
ISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
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POINT FOUR 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 11 (TRANSCRIPT 226) IS 
NEITHER ARGUMENTATIVE NOR DOES IT COMMENT 
UPON THE WEIGHT WHICH THE JURY SHOULD GIVE 
TO THE EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 AND CORRECT-
LY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON DEFENDANTS' DUTY. 
In Point One of the argument plaintiff cites as error 
the refusal of the trial court to give his requested in-
structions to the effect that it was the duty of the de-
fendant to exercise a high degree of care to enable the 
plaintiff to alight and get from the bus in safety and that 
the degtee of care required is such as a very pr~de:p. t, 
careful and competent person would exercise under simi-
lar circum tances. 
The argument then goes on to cite a number of au-
thorities all of which admittedly define the standard of 
care required of ·a common carrier and concludes with 
the argument that, irrespective of whether or not a school···· 
bus is a common carrier, the operator of a. school bus 
should exercise a high degree of care for its pas-
sengers. The fallacy of the argument is three-fold; first, 
the defendant, school district, and the operator of the bus 
was not a common carrier; second, the court in its 
instructions to the jury properly instructed the jury upon 
the higher duty which would be owed to children of' a 
tender age; and third, plaintiff's requested instruction 
added nothing to those given by the court. 
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A. The Driver of a School Bus is not a Common 
Carrier. 
A public or common carrier is defined: "A public 
or common carrier of passengers is one which, as a regu-
lar business, undertakes for hire to carry all persons, 
within certain limitations, who may appy for passage, 
and holds itself out as engaged in such business." 13 CJS 
Section 530 page 1034. 
"A 'Common Motor Carrier of Passengers' means 
any person who holds himself o·ut to the public as willing 
to undertake for hire to transport by motor vehicle from 
place to place, persons who Inay choose to employ him." 
76-5-13, Utah Code Annotated as amended. 
As contradistinguished from this, ''A private carrier 
of passengers is one who, without being engaged in such 
business as a public employment, undertakes to deliver 
passengers for hire or reward or even gratuitously." 13 
c~JS Section 531, Page 1036. 
By statute "Contract Motor Carrier of Passengers 
means any person engaged in the transportation by motor 
vehicle of persons for hire, and not included in the term, 
motor carrier of passengers as hereinbefore defined." 76.;. 
5-13, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
The distinguishing feature between the two callings 
is not that .passengers are carried for hire, since this is 
true in either case, but that a common carrier is engaged 
in and holds itself out as engaged in the business of car-
rying passengers. to any person or part of the public who 
may choose to employ it whereas this element is missing 
in the case of a private carrier. 
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In ~tate Y. Nelson, 65 Utah 457, a person who op-
erated an automobile on1nibus pursuant to contract with a 
ca1nping association, in ''"'llich he transported exclusively 
guests or prospectiYe guests of the association, and their 
baggage, for an agreed daily wage, was held not to be 
a comn1on or public carrier. 
In this case defendant did not hold himself out as 
engaged in the business of a common carrier of pas-
sengers but rather transported students to and from 
school by reason of a private contr~ct for a definite 
wage between him and the school district to carry only 
a very lin1ited and predetermined group, that is, school 
students. (Tr. 127 -128) There is no authority cited in 
which the operator of a school bus has been defined as 
and held to the standard of care ·required of a common 
carrier. On the other hand, there are a number of cases 
"\vhich have held. the operator of a school bus is a private 
carrier and that ordinary prudence for the safety of chil-
dren under similar circumstances is all that is required. 
In the case of Shannon et al v. Central-Gaitor Union 
School District et al, a California case, 23 P2d 769, cited 
in appellant's brief, an action against a school district 
for injuries to a child of ten and one-half years who was 
injured while leaving a school bus and crossing a road, 
the court said: 
"We are of the opinion that a bus which is op-
erated only for the convenience of a particular 
school under the circumstances of. this case is a 
mere private carrier as distinguished from a com-
mon carrier, and that the ordinary prudence for 
the safety of children under similar circumstances 
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is all that is required of the district ~r the driver 
of the bus." 
This case was followed in Foster v. Einer (Calif.) 158 
P2d 978. 
In the case of Gaudette v. McGlauklin (New Hamp-
shire) 189 Atlantic 872, 88 NH 368, an action against 
the driver of a bus for the death of a school child which 
was struck by an automobile after alighting from a bus 
and while crossing the h~ghway the court said: 
"The plaintiff's exception to the failure of the 
court to charge that 'a carrier of passengers is 
bound to exercise the highest degree of care and 
diligence,' is without merit. Even a common car-
rier is not held to such a high standard and the de-
fendant here was only a private carrier. As such, 
ordinary car"e under all the circumstances was all 
that was required of him." 
. In the case of Archuleta v. Jacobs, 94 P2d 706 a 
New Mexico case, an action was brought for the wrong-
ful death of a child who was struck by an automobile 
after alighting from a school bus. The trial court had in-
structed the jury as follo~s: "And in connection with 
these definitions you are instructed that the driver of a 
school bus transporting children of tender age owes 
to them the greatest degree of care for their safety, and 
such course of conduct should extend from the time the 
children board such bus, and during their transportation 
to their destination, and including the alighting there-
from by such children under circumstances to insure their 
safety and leaving the immediate scene of the bus stop. 
" The appellate court held: 
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,., \'7 e rannot esea pe the conclusion that this 
instruction of the court cast upon defendant an 
undue burden, and that this constitutes reversible 
error. It eannot be said that the law may apply 
to the conduct of the plaintiff's deceased the rule 
of 'ordinary care' only, and then say, as was said 
in substance, in these instructions, that as to de-
fendant, his conduct 1nust be such that everything 
'possible to be done' must be done by him to avoid 
injury to the deceased, if he is to escape liability." 
B. The Court Correctly Instructed the Jury on the 
Duty Owed to Children. 
There is no question that the operator of a school 
bus owes a greater or higher duty of care to children of a 
tender age than would he. owe to adults under similar 
circumstances. The standard of care ·of a reasonable 
and prudent person is a variable factor depending upon 
the circumstances of each case. As is said in Archuleta 
v. Jacobs, cited above: 
"Of course we know that the amount or degree 
of diligence and caution _which is necessary to con-
stitute due, reasonable or ordinary care changes 
with changing conditions, and we find wide varia-
tions according as circumstances in some instances 
require greater vigilance and caution than in 
others (Citations) and yet the law has found the 
foregoing and universally approved definitions 
sufficiently flexible and reliable for use as a guide 
in all such cases." 
"It is also true, of cour-se, that the age of a 
child and its ability to look out for itself and capa-
city to appreciate danger are always a proper 
matter for consideration for determining whether 
proper care has been exercised as to such child. 
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Conduct that might easily qualify as ordinarily-
and prudent care as to a child of one age, and with 
capacity to understand and appreciate danger, 
might easily fall short of such classification with 
reference to a child of more tender years .and of 
less ·understanding and appreciation of danger. 
(Citations given) And yet, we still measure the 
care required by the one standard, viz., 'What 
would a reasonably prudent man do under like 
circumstancesf" 
As was said in Cartright v. Graves, 184 SW 2nd 373, 
in which a child was not quite six years of age: 
"That the age of a child and his consequent 
ability or lack of ability to look after her own 
safety after alighting from the bus is, as declared 
as a court of appeals; 'the dominant factor.'" 
The court quoting from Townsley v. Yellow Cab Com-
pany, 145 Tennessee 91, 237 SW 58, went on to say: 
"Years ago in Wheeley v. Whitman, one Head 
( 610), 38 Tenn. 610, this court expressly approved 
Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213, 54 Am. Dec. 67, to 
th~ effect that children of tender age are entitled 
to a degree of care from others proportioned to · 
their ability to forsee and avoid the perils which 
they may encounter, and holding t.hat-'What 
would be but ordinary neglect in regard to one 
whom the defendants ·supposed a person of full 
age and capacity, would be gross I}eglect as to a 
child, or one known to be incapable of escaping 
danger.'" 
In the present case the court gave three instructions 
defining the standard which the jury should apply in de-
termining the duty of the defendant in regard· to the 
plaintiff. In Instruction No. 9 (Tr. 225) the jury was in-
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strueted that the defendant \vas required to use such care 
as a reasonable and prudent person would use under like 
conditions a,nd circunudances. In Instruction No. 4 (Tr. 
221) negligence 'vas defined as the doing of some act 
\Yhich a reasonable and prudent person having due regard 
for th.e surro undin.g circ~unstances would not do or the 
failure to do some act \vhich a reasonable and prudent 
person having a regard for all the surro.unding circum.-
stances would do. It \vas further defined as failure to 
use that degree of care which a reasonable and p-rudent 
person in like or similar circumstances would use.· In 
Instruction No. 5 (Tr. 222) the jury was instructed that 
in determining whether or not the defendant used reason-
able care they should take into consideration the number 
and ·ages of his passengers, the type of a vehicle he wa.s 
operating, the place at which and the position in which he 
stopped the vehicle, the conditions of the· weather, the 
conditions of the surface of the ground on which plaintiff 
alighted from_ the bus, and any a;nd all facts and circum-
stances shown by the evidence e.ffecting the care w·hich 
reasonable and prudent person under like conditions 
would use. 
It is submitted that the jury were properly instructed 
as to the standard which they should apply in determin-
ing the duty of the defendant toward the plaintiff and the 
elements, including the tender age of the plaintiff, which 
they .should take into consideration in defining that duty. 
C. The Instruction Requested by Defendant if not 
:Improper would add nothing to the Instruction given by 
Court. 
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The phrase "high degree of care," or "highest degree 
of care," or any similar expressions, as contended for in 
counsel's brief, mean nothing more than "the care ~hat an 
ordinarily prudent person .would exercise under all the 
facts and circumstances." 
"The test of care is not whether in degree it 
should be slight or ordinary or extreme care, but 
commensurate care, due care under the. circum-
stances." 
Catesv~ Hall, (N.C.) 88 S.E. 524; 
Fitzgerald v. R. R. Co., (N.C.) 54 S .. E. 91. 
. "The law of negligence is not based upon the 
highest degree of care which a highly .prudent 
person would use, but on the average· reasonable 
care-the degree of care that twelve men selected 
at random from the vicenage, will say is reason-
able under all the circumstances." 
Spanknebel v. R.R. Co., 111 N.Y.S. 705, 707. 
In Union Traction Co. v. Berry, (Ind.) 121 N. E. 655, 
the court gives a very clear exposition of the principles 
with respect to the standard of care in negligence cases. 
To quote: 
"As bearing on the· issue of negligence the 
court gave the following instruction: 'If you find 
from the evidence in this case that on and about 
the 23rd day of May, 1914, the defendant was a 
common carrier of passengers, then I instruct 
you that it was held to the highest degree of care 
and diligence for the safety of passengers· con-
sistent with the mode of conveyance employed, and 
that the omission of the defendant to exercise 
the highest degree of practicable care constituted 
negligence on its· part.'" 
10 
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·'By the first part of this instruction, pre-
ceding the conjunction ~and,' the court undertakes 
to define the duty 'Yhich the la'v i1nposes on appel-
lant as a carrier of passengers, and by the latter 
part the court atten1pts to direct the jury. as to the 
application of the rule to the case on trial. Objec-
tion is made to this instruction on the ground 
that it inYades the province of the jury, the ob-
jection being specifically directed to the latter 
part~ but this part is so closely connected in mean-
ing with what precedes it as to require a consider-
ation of the instruction as a whole. By this in.:. 
struction the court told the jury, in substance, that 
the law imposed a different and a higher duty on 
carriers of passengers with reference to the exer-
cise of care than rested on persons or corporations 
sustaining other relations involving the exercise 
of care." 
"In the case of Bedford, S. 0. & B. R. Co. v. 
Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551, 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 277, the 
court said: 'The rule that there may be degrees 
of negligence has long ago been discarded in this 
state, and, when it is said that an occurrence· came 
about through the slight negligence or gross negli-
gence of another, it is, in either case, nothing more 
than saying that such person was negligent.' " 
"Negligence is the neglect or violation of the 
duty to use care. If there can be no degrees of 
negligence, it must follow that there can be no 
degrees of duty. Duty is an absolute term. The 
law requires nothing more than duty; it will ex-
cuse nothing less. The duty to exercise care for 
the safety of another arises as a matter of law out 
of some relation existing between the parties, and 
it is, the province· of the court to determine whether 
such a relation is shown as. gives rise to such 
duty .. In determining whether the-relation shown 
11 
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gives rise to a duty to use care, the court decides 
a pure question of law. This question cannot be 
submitted to a jury. Where a duty to exercise care 
exists, it is always the same, regardless of the na-
ture of the -relation out of which it ari~es. It can-
not be said that the duty to use care which arises 
out of the court to carrier and passenger differs 
in kind, character, or degree from the duty which 
arises out of the relation of master and se-rvant, 
or out of any other relation which imposes the 
legal duty to use care. 
"In submitting the determination to a jury 
of a question of negligence, which is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact, the court is required to define 
the duty which the law imposes. This duty is de-
fined by the law as 'due care,' 'ordinary care,' or 
'reasonable care,' which terms are regarded by 
the courts as having the same ·significance. It is 
als·o the duty of the court to state the rule fixing . 
the standard of care which will measure up to the 
duty imposed by law~ The court should then leave 
it to the jury to decide whether the acts and con-
duct of the defendant in respect to the matter be-
fore the court measures up to the standards of 
care fixed by the law. In defining the duty and 
fixing the standard of care by which the jury is 
to measure the conduct of the defendant, the court 
does not consider the facts of the particular case. 
The duty is the same under all relations, and the 
standard of care which will measure up to the 
duty in all cases is such care as a person of reas-
onable or ordinary prudence would exercise in 
view of all the conditions and circumstances as 
disclosed by the evidence in the particular case. 
It is for the jury to consider the conditions and 
circumstances disclosed by the evidence, in deter-
. mining. what action should have been taken .or 
. 12 
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avoided, what precautions should have been em-
ployed, and what course of conduct should have 
been pursued in order to measure up to the duty 
of 'due care' which the law imposes. In determin-
ing this fact the jury applies the standard fur-
nished by the court, which is, What would a person 
of ordinary prudence have regarded as reasonably 
necessary or proper under the circumstances~" 
• • • • 
"The use of such terms as 'slight care,' 'great 
care,' ~highest degree of care,' or other like expres-
sions, in instructions, as indicating the quantum 
of care the law exacts under special conditions and 
circumstances, is misleading; and when so used 
they constitute an invasion of the province of the 
jury, whose function it is to determine what 
amount of care is required to measure up to the 
duty imposed by law under the facts of the par~ 
ticular case. The law imposes but one duty in 
such cases, and that is the duty to use due care; 
and the law recognizes only one standard by which 
the quantum of care can be measured, and that is 
the care ·which a person of ordinary prudence 
'vould exercise under like circumstances." 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION 7 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE REQUIRED 
NUMBER OF JURORS MUST AGREE UPON THE SAME 
NEGLIGENT ACT OR ACTS OR OMISSIONS TO ACT IN 
ORDER TO RETURN A VERDICT IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR. 
In Point Two of the argument the appellant objects 
to the court's instruction No. 7 (Tr. 224) wherein the 
court instructed the jury that the required number of 
jurors must agree upon the same negligent act or acts 
or upon the same failure to act but that it is not necessary 
13 
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that plaintiff prove that the defendant was negligent in 
each and all of the respects charged in plaintiff's answers 
to defendant's interrogatories and that it is sufficient if 
the defendant was negligent in any one or more o~ such 
particulars. Appellant asserts that if three of the jury 
concurred'that the defendant was negligent because he did 
not give the plaintiff sufficient time to get off the bus and 
two concurred that the defendant was negligent because 
he stopped the bus too near the fence and snow and four 
others concurred· that the _defendant was negligent for 
some other reason, this would entitle the plaintiff to a 
verdict providing the other ultimate facts were found in 
plaintiff's favor. The appellant's illustration is unfor-
tunate for the reason that in the example the required 
number of· jurors actually concur on the same act or fail-
ure to act, that is, at least six or seven jurors do concur 
on op_e common ground of negligence even though four 
of the six or seven also concur on another ground of 
negligence. However, we interpret appellant's argument 
to be that if two jurors concur that defendant was negli-
gent in one respect and three .concur that he was negli-
gent in a different respect and four concur that he was 
negligent in some respect different from the others this 
would justify the jury in rendering a verdict for the 
plaintiff. 
This argument must fall under a logical e~amination 
for the reason that it is based upon the false premise that 
a concurrence of two· or three jurors that_ the defendant 
was negligent in some particular constitutes a finding of 
negligence. Actually, if only two jurors concur that the 
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defendant \Yas negligent in son1e respect, such concur-
rence does not con~titute a finding of negligence but ac-
tually constitutes a. finding that the defendant was not 
negligent since the remaining six of the eight jurors must 
be presumed by their failure to concur to have believed 
that the d~fendant \Yas not negligent in that respect. 
'•It is established by a number of cases from 
several jurisdictions that a failure of. the jury to 
find as to the existence of essential facts or issues 
the burden of establishing them, on the theory that 
is equivalent to-a fip.ding against the party having 
he failed to prove them, or that there was no evi-
dence as to them." 76 ALR 1143. 
By the same reasoning the failure of the required 
number of the jurors to concur that the defendant was 
negligent ill any particular respect constitutes a finding 
by the jurors that the defendant was not negligent in 
any respect. 
vVhenever several acts ·of negligence are· charged 
any ·one of which is sufficient as a basis for recovery, it is, 
of course, necessary for the juror to find only that the de-
fendant was negligent as to one of the acts charged but 
there can be no finding if at least six jurors do not agree 
that the defendant was negligent in some one respect .. 
Under the appellant's theory it would be possible for the 
jury to return a verdict against the defendant if three 
should find he was negligent in allowing the child to 
alight in some unsafe place and three others concurred 
that he was negligent in starting the bus before the child 
alighted although five jurors should believe that the de-
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· fendant was not negligent in allowing a child to alight 
at an unsafe place and five jurors should believe that he 
was not negligent in starting the bus up before the child 
had alighted. 
In Trinity and B. V. Railway Co. v. Geary, 172 South 
West 545 (Texas) an action was brought to recover for 
personal injuries. The claimed acts of negligence which 
caused the injury were set up in separate counts and the 
court submitted the case to the jury upon three counts of 
negligence. The statute provided "no verdict shall be 
rendered in any cause except upon the concurrence of all 
1nembers of the jury trying the same." The jury found 
plaintiff, Morris Geary, entitled to recover under his 
first and third count and assessed his damages at $2000.-
00. The court said: 
"Interpreted by the charge, the verdict clearly 
expresses that a part of the jury found for the 
plain tiff under the first ground, and a part under 
the third ground. It is manifest that some of the 
jury based their finding on the first, and some on 
the third ground, but all did not agree on either. 
There being no 'concurrence' of all the members 
of the jury on either ground of negligence, the ac-
tion of the District Court in receiving the verdict . 
was in direct. disregard of the statute." 
In Baker v. Allen (Colorado) 189 P4 a verdict find-
ing defendant "guilty of mallice, fraud, or willful deceit 
in committing the tort complained of," was held bad, be-
ing in the disjunctive; it being impossible to say there-
from whether defendant was guilty of fraud or willful 
deceit or whether some of the jurors found him guilty of 
one and others of the other offense. 
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In the case of Barker v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
(Kansas) 132 P156 an action brought to recover the dam.-
ages resulting from a fire originating from the defend-
ant's railroad engine, the jury found that the fire did ori-
ginate from the engine and the defendant requested the 
court to question the jury as to whether the jury believed 
the engine was lacking in proper equipment or whether 
the fire .·originated from imprope-r operation of the 
engine. The court refused to subn1it the questions to the 
jury and this was held to be error by the court which 
said: 
"The defendant was entitled to a finding by 
the jury as to whether the engine in question was 
lacking in proper equipment, or whether the fire 
originated from i1nproper operation of the engine 
by those in charge. · !1:any of the questions calling 
for details touching insufficiency or mismanage-
ment were properly refused. While the statute 
makes the setting out of a fire caused by the oper-
ation of a road prima facia evidence of negligence, 
still when the jury find that the fire originated 
from the engine, they should be require4, upon re-
quest of the defendant, also to find whether it 
was caused by insufficient equipment or improper 
management." 
"We cannot agree with the contention of 
plaintiff's counsel that if half of the jurors be-
lieved the fire was caused by a defect in the engine 
and the other half that it was caused by improper 
operation, the plaintiff would still be entitled to 
recover. If this were true there might be a con-
census of opinion as to the l~ability of the defend-
ant on twelve different basis on which such opin-
ion could rest, each relied upon by only one of the 
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jurors and none ~by all. Their unanimous opin-
ion as to the essential facts of the case, as well 
as to, the general results, must be in favor of the 
prevailing party. The statutory right to have 
proper questions submitted having been denied, 
the defendant did not have the kind of trial it was 
entitled to." 
The cases cited by appellant are not in point for the 
reason that they do not concern jury verdicts or there is 
no showing that the jury did not agree on the issues nec-
essary to support a verdict. In the absence of a showing 
to the contrary, it must be presumed that a jury arriving 
at a verdict followed the law and the p-roper procedure, in 
doing so. Therefore, if there are two acts of negligence 
charged, one which renders the defendant liable and one 
which does not, the jury will be presumed to have found 
the defendant negligent in the manner which would ren-
der him liable. Also where there are two counts of negli- , 
__ gence alleged, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, 
a sufficient number of jurors to sustain a verdict must 
be presumed to have found the issues which would sup-
port such a verdict, provided there is sufficient evidence 
to support a verdict upon either or both grounds. 
POINT THREE 
THE EVIDENCE WARRANTED THE COURT'S GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 9 (Tr. 224) TO THE EFFECT 
THAT IF THE JURY SHOULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF 
RAN TOWARD THE BUS AT A TIME AND PLACE WHERE 
THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT SEE HIM THEY SHOULD 
RETURN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT 
IF THEY FURTHER FOUND PLAINTIFF DID NOT EX-' 
PECT SUCH ACTION AND ACTED AS A REASONABLE 
AND PRUDENT PERSON UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Appellant's argument and the authority cited by 
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him in regard to this point is that there was no evidence 
in the trial which would sustain the giving of such an 
instruction. 
This argument overlooks the testimony of Roland 
Olsen (Tr. 74-75), wherein he testifi~d that he had been 
guilty of bizzing, or grabbing hold of the back of the bus 
and sliding along with it, on a previous occasion, nor does 
it take into account the testimony .of Shirley Cluff (Tr. 
190) that Ronald Olsen was running toward the bus at 
the time of the accident in question here. Moreover, the 
argument does not give the fair import to be testimony · 
of this defendant. 
The testimony of the defendant was that the plaintiff 
did alight on a sound and safe gravel shoulder. of the 
road, not on, but away from the traveled portion of' the 
highway (Tr. 138-139); that it was a perfectly safe place 
for plaintiff to stand and remain until the bus should 
move forward in its usual way. Defendant further testi-
fied that plaintiff was about five feet from the bus before 
the driver put the bus in motion (Tr. 154-180). And that 
apparently plaintiff was injured by coming into contact 
with the rear wheel of the bus while the bus was in mo-
tion. It ce-rtainly could not be prejudicial error for the 
court to use the words "ran towards the side of the bus 
near the right wheel" if he actually "walked," when he 
could not have been injured unless he did one or the other. 
In either event his injury was due to an act of his own 
volition. Whether he ran or walked into the bus is im-
material. If, therefore, the accident could not have hap-
pened except by his own act in making such a movement 
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that he was struck by the bus, the jury had a perfect right 
to infer or find from the evidence that the plaintiff was 
injured by "running" into or "walking" into the side of 
the bus near the right wheel. That is the only possible 
deduction that can be arrived at from the established 
fact that the boy was four or five feet away from the bus 
when it resumed its motion and that he was injured by 
contacting the bus near the right wheel. 
The rule as stated in 64 C. J. page ~28 is stated as 
follows: 
"The propriety of an instruction that the jury 
may draw reasonable and natural inferences from 
the facts proved to their satisfaction, however, has 
been recognized, and while there is authority to 
the contrary, the view has been taken that the 
court may properly charge that the jury may find 
any fact proved which they think rightfully and 
reasonably inferable from the evidence. Further 
instructions suggesting to the jury inferences 
which may be drawn from the evidence have been 
upheld, and the view has been expressed that 
where there is no dispute as to the immediate fact 
testified to and the questiop is as to the effect of 
such fact, it is not an inva~ion of the province of 
the jury for the judge to point out to them the 
different conclusions which 1nay be drawn and the 
circumstances which may incline them to believe 
the one or the other." 
The authority cited in the text as contrary to this 
rule is the case of Henry v. Colorado Land, etc. Co., 51 
Pac. 90, but the instruction given in that case and which 
was found to be objectionable, is altogether different from 
the instruction here complained of, and the court in effect 
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recognizes that in a proper case the principle for which 
we contend may be applied. The following is the court's 
statement: 
HTo state generally that whenever evidence 
is given the jury n1ay infer therefrom any fact 
which they think reasonable is an inaccurate ex-
pression of the rule. The inference must of neces-
sity flow from the fact and by a legitimate in-
ference under the principles which govern the in-
troduction of testimony. It is not every inference 
which the jury may think deducible from the facts 
which they have a right to take as a basis for their 
verdict. This would leave the determination of 
causes too much to conjecture and relieve them 
from the yokes of the law which they are only too 
willing to shake off and act on their own notions 
of what is right and wrong regardless of the 
proof." 
The inference that the boy ran into the bus of neces-
sity flows from proof that he was four or five feet away 
from the bus after he had alighted and that he could 
not have been injured unless he had of his own volition 
run into it.· 
In 53 Am. Jur. 458 it is said: 
"It is not necessary that theTe be categorical 
evidence as to a matter covered by an instruction, 
it being sufficient if there is evidence of facts 
from which the fact might b~ inferred." 
And in 64 C. J. 783, it is said: 
"The rule that an instruction should conform 
to the evidence does not require that the instruc- · 
tion shall be supported by positive testimony al-
ways. It is sufficient if the assumed fact may be 
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inferred reasonabfy from the circumstances 
proved." 
. This case is no different in principle from Bryant 
v. Bingham Stage Line, 60 Utah 299, 208 P. 541. To quote: 
"There are certain physical facts that are not 
in dispute: (1) Both the automobile and the street 
cars were moving at the time of the collision at 
rates of speed ranging from 8 to 20 miles an hour 
-the exact rate is immaterial. ( 3) The fender of 
the street car struck the right rear wheel of the 
automobile while it was passing over the north 
, track upon which the street car was moving. From 
these facts alone the conclusion is irresistible that 
the automobile was driving upon the track im-
mediately in front of the moving street car. If it 
had not .been driven upon the track immediately 
in front of the moving street car the collision 
could not have occured. Assuming that the auto-
mobile was moving only 8 miles an hour, which is 
the lowest estimate made by any witness, it would 
be moving a fraction more than 11 feet per second. 
The automobile, in attempting to cross the track, 
having been struck before it could get across, must 
have been driven upon the track immediately in 
front of the moving street car. We think, in view 
of the uncontroverted physical facts, the trial 
court was justified in assuming that the automo-
bile was driven on the track immediately in front 
of the moving street car." 
The court clearly had a right to state in the instruc-
tion that the jury might find that the child contacted the 
bus near the right wheel at a time and place where the 
defendant could not see him, and also that they might 
find that the defendant as a reasonable and prudent per-
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son did not expect such action on the part of the plain-
tiff. If there "'ere no testin1ony as to whether the driver 
could or could not see the plaintiff contact the right side 
of the bus near the rear wheel the court would be war-
ranted in taking judicial notice that the driver of a bus 
seated on the left front side could not see the part ·of the 
bus near the rear right wheel. 
POINT FOUR 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 11 (TRANSCRIPT 226) IS 
NEITHER ARGUMENTATIVE NOR DOES IT COMMENT 
ON THE WEIGHT THE JURY SHOULD GIVE TO THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The instruction complained of reads : 
"In weighing the evidence adduced in this 
cause pertaining to the defendant's alleged negli-
gence, it is your duty to consider it as you would 
under all the facts and circumstances existing 
at the tim.e of the accident, and not to consider it 
as you would looking back upon the event from 
this later date. Quite ordinarily, individual ac-
tions in any given set of circumstances may dis-
close faults and criticisms when looked back upon 
· and tested by cool and deliberate thinking away 
·from the event, which would not be apparent to a 
reasonable and p:rudent person at the time he is 
surrounded by the circumstances of the accident. 
Thus the question is whether or not the defendant 
at the time of the accident, and surrounded by all 
of the circumstances shown by the evidence to 
have surrounded him at such time, acted in all 
respects as a reasonable and prudent person 
would act. If he did so act, he was not negligent, 
and therefore, he is not responsible for damages 
resulting from the accident. But if he did not so 
act in any.particular alleged in the pleadings then 
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he was negligent, and is charged with all damages 
proximately caused by such negligence." 
It is correct that the judge should not invade the 
province of the jury and decide questions of fact and the 
weight which should be given to the evidence. The fore-
going instruction does neither. No issues of fact are 
found. in the instruction by inference and the jury are 
not told what weight should be given. to any evidence. 
They are merely told that in considering the evidence 
they must "consider it as you would under all the facts 
and circumstances existing at the time of the accident, 
and not to consider it as· you would looking back upon 
the event." This is a correct statement of the manner 
in which the jury should consider the evidence: 
"The test of actionable negligence is· what a reason-
ably prudent person, or a reasonably prudent and careful 
one, would have done under the circumstances, before the 
· accident, it is what a reasonably prudent and careful 
person would have done under the circumstances in the 
discharge of his duty to the injured person, or what a 
reasonably prudent man would have done in the discharge 
of his duty as they existed at the time of the accident, 
and not what could or might have been done to have pre-
vented a particular accident." 
In Milasevich v. F'ox, Western Montana Theatre 
Corporation, 165 P2d 195, it was held that the test of ac-
tionable negligence is not what might have prevented a 
particular accident, but what reasonably prudent men 
would have done in discharge of their duties under the 
circumstances as they existed at time of accident. · 
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In nlaynard Y. City of Helena, 160 P2d 484 (Mon-
tana) an instruction that one suddenly put in danger 
was not required impertively to do that which a~ter peril 
\vas ended it \\'"as seen might have been done, and that 
under such circun1stances a person would not be required 
to exercise san1e judgment that an uninterested bystander 
1night manifest, was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the ·defendant has failed to show 
any prejudicial error in any of the court's instructions 
and that no new trial should be awarded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STE.W ART, CANNON & HANSON 
By REX J. HANSON 
DON J. HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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